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PRODUCTS LIABILITY
TED OCCHIALINO

Determining that liability for harm caused by defective products
should be resolved without reference to outmoded rules of negligence and attracted by the apparent simplicity of the rule set forth in
the Restatement of Torts,' the New Mexico Supreme Court in 1972
adopted Section 402A as the rule of strict tort liability to be applied
in New Mexico.' Presented with the issue of whether plaintiff's
negligent conduct could serve as a defense to a products liability
action, the Court of Appeals in Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft3 has demonstrated that at least on some occasions, fault
principles are relevant and that Section 402A's treatment of the
issues is incomplete, if not misleading.
Bendorf was injured in a two car collision when his vehicle entered
an intersection in violation of the controlling traffic signal. Bendorf
filed suit against the manufacturer of the vehicle he was driving,
alleging that the cause of the accident was a defective seat mechanism which caused the front seat to jump forward, preventing him
from successfully applying the brakes. The manufacturer denied that
a defect existed and asserted alternatively that if a defect did exist, it
was not causally related to the accident. In addition, defendant
alleged that the plaintiff was not exercising reasonable care in the
general operation of the car at the time of the accident.
The trial court properly charged the jury that the absence of a
defect or of any causal relationship between the defect and the
accident or harm would preclude recovery. 4 At the request of the
defendant, the court also instructed the jury that if the defendant
had proven that the plaintiff was negligent in failing to exercise real.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
2. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972). The New Mexico Court of
Appeals had earlier cited Section 402A with apparent approval in Schrib v. Seidenberg, 80
N.M. 573, 458 P.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1969), and in 1970 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
decision of a Federal District Court judge who concluded that New Mexico would adopt
Section 402A. Moomey v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 429 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1970).
3. Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88 N.M. 355, 540 P.2d 835 (Ct. App.
1975), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 319, 540 P.2d 249 (1975).
4. "One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous ... is
" Restatement (Second) of Torts
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused..
§ 402A (1965) (emphasis added).

NEW MEXICO LA WREVIEW

(Vol. 6

sonable care in operating the vehicle at the time of the accident, the
jury was to find for the defendant. The jury returned a general
verdict for the defendant, and judgment was entered accordingly.

The Court of Appeals reversed, all judges agreeing that the trial judge
erred in not informing the jury that plaintiff's negligent failure to
exercise reasonable care in driving was not a defense unless a causal
relationship between the negligence and the accident was established.
Because additional issues concerning the scope of defenses to a
products liability action would arise at the required new trial, the
majority of the Court of Appeals discussed in detail the circumstances under which the plaintiff's negligent conduct could bar his
recovery in a products liability action and the formulae under which
such conduct. Finding
the jury should be instructed to consider
"grievous error in analysis of law"' in a portion of the majority
opinion, Judge Sutin concurred in a separate opinion.
While the text of Section 402A does not address the issue of the
extent to which plaintiff's negligent conduct may bar his recovery,
accompanying Comment n does provide that:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the
other hand, the form of contributory negligence which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk,
is a defense.... 6
The majority" and concurring opinions' agreed that Comment n
correctly states the law to be applied, thus rejecting one form of
contributory negligence as a defense9 while reintroducing assump-

, 540 P.2d at 843 (concurring opinion). Whether Judge Sutin's char5. 88 N.M. at
acterization of the majority opinion is correct is discussed infra at note 17.
6. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment n, at 356 (1965).
,540 P.2d at 838-839.
7. 88 N.M. at
,540 P.2d at 845.
8. 88 N.M. at
9. Because there had been no allegation in the pleadings or at the trial that Bendorf had
negligently failed to discover the defect, the majority opinion was careful to note the
tentative nature of its conclusion: "unless some future fact pattern should demonstrate a
contrary necessity, we are inclined to adopt that view set forth in Comment (n) .. " 88
,
, 540 P.2d at 838. Judge Sutin expressed no reservation at all. 88 N.M. at
N.M. at
540 P.2d at 845. Given the widespread support for this position found in other jurisdictions,
e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Henderson, 500 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), see Annot., 46
A.L.R.3d 240 (1972), and the Supreme Court's statement that in the field of products
liability there is nothing wrong with " 'following the leader' . .. if the leader is going in the
right direction," Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 735, 497 P.2d 732, 737 (1972), it
seems unlikely that a different result will be found necessary in the future.
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tion of risk to New Mexico. 1 0 Difficulty arose not from the rules
expressed in the Comment for the conduct there described but from
the fact that as to other forms of misconduct by the plaintiff the
Comment is silent. Lacking specific guidance in the Restatement, the
court unanimously concluded that additional defenses were available
to the defendant who established that plaintiff's misconduct caused
the accident or enhanced the injuries he suffered.
The majority concluded that misuse of the product by the plaintiff, though not mentioned in Comment n, may be available as a

defense to a strict tort liability action.' ' The court noted that evidence of misuse was admissible to negate the plaintiff's required
allegation that a causal relationship existed between the defect and
the injury.' 2 Thus, while product misuse is not one of the affirmative defenses mentioned in Comment n, it may be raised in the
defendant's pleadings by denial of the plaintiff's allegation that a
defect existed which caused the complained of injury.'"
10. In Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971), the Supreme Court
eliminated the separate defense of assumption of risk and held that the doctrine should be
merged with contributory negligence. The court concluded that while assumption of risk
was no longer to have independent existence, conduct which had supported the defense
"will be as efficacious as formerly" although "[i] t will ... henceforth be regarded as
contributory negligence and governed by the principles pertaining to that doctrine." Id. at
, 491 P.2d at 1152. Because Comment n preserves as a defense "the form of contributory negligence which ... commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk,"
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A Comment n, at 356 (1965), Judge Sutin correctly
noted that "[a] vailability of this defense does not conflict with New Mexico's abandonment
of assumption of risk as a defense apart from contributory negligence," Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88 N.M.,
, 540 P.2d 835, 844 (1975) (concurring
opinion).
11. 88 N.M. at
,540 P.2d at 839.
12. Id. In his concurring opinion Judge Sutin agreed that "[tihis defense would be
proper if it claimed that the defect did not cause the plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle;
that the defect was not the proximate cause of the accident; that the sole proximate cause
of the collision was the negligent operation of the vehicle." 88 N.M. at
,540 P.2d at
844.
Neither the majority nor the concurring opinions alluded to the fact that the Comments
to 402A would permit evidence of plaintiff's misuse of the product to be admitted not only
to negate causation, but also to establish that the product was not defective. Comment g
defines defective condition as one "not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will
be unreasonably dangerous to him" and then states that "[tihe seller is not liable when he
delivers the product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it
harmful by the time it is consumed." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A Commentg,
at 351 (1965). The following comment states that "a product is not in a defective condition
when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the injury results from abnormal
handling ... the seller is not liable." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A Comment h
(1965). Thus, evidence that the harm was caused by misuse tends to negate the allegation
that the product was in a defective condition, a separate though related position, from that
which the majority pursued.
13. 88 N.M.
, 540 P.2d at 839-840. Judge Sutin agreed that when misuse is asserted
as it was by the defendant in Bendorf "[p]laintiff's misuse, rather than a product defect,
becomes the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries or damages. Thus, defendant can assert
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The majority opinion in Bendorf equated the allegations that
plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout, to yield the right of way,
and to keep his vehicle under proper control with conduct amounting to misuse, and therefore agreed that it was proper to instruct the
jury that such misconduct may bar the plaintiff from recovery. However, the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that it was necessary
that such misconduct be the cause of the accident. A new trial was
ordered because "defendant's defense should only have prevailed if
plaintiff's negligent driving had caused the accident and the court's
instruction allowed it to prevail regardless of the cause of the
Because the defendant had limited his claim that
accident. ... "
evidence of misuse was relevant to the assertion that it tended to
negage causation, the court declined to consider "one of the most
' '
hotly debated issues in products liability litigation today,"
whether misuse may bar recovery where the defect and the misuse
are concurrent causes of the accident or the harm.
Judge Sutin agreed that misuse of the product by the plaintiff
should sometimes bar recovery but because he feared that a general
rule recognizing such a defense "would destroy the doctrine of
special products liability under Section 402A"' 6 he attempted to
plaintiff's misuse to disprove causation. Strictly speaking, this is part of the denial of
, 540 P.2d at 845 (conplaintiff's case, rather than an affirmative defense." 88 N.M.
curring opinion).
, 540 P.2d at 840. Judge Hendley noted that once the trial court
14. 88 N.M. at
erroneously concluded that misuse should be considered as an affirmative defense, it was
quite natural, though erroneous, to fail to instruct the jury that the misuse and not the
defect must have been the cause of the accident. Since the very nature of an affirmative defense
is that "it will bar plaintiff's recovery once plaintiff's right to recover is otherwise estab, 540 P.2d at 838, positing misuse as an affirmative defense permits
lished," 88 N.M. at
it to serve as a bar to plaintiff's recovery even when the misuse does not negate plaintiff's
, 540 P.2d at 840. The court suggested that when the
allegation of causation. 88 N.M.
case was retried, the trial judge should explain to the jury the necessary relationship of
plaintiff's allegation of causation and defendant's assertion of misuse "immediately after the
trial court instructs that defendant denies all the plaintiff's claims and before it instructs as
to affirmative defenses, if any." Id.
, 540 P.2d at 839. Asserting that the debate was largely confined to
15. 88 N.M. at
"crashworthiness," e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied 385 U.S. 836 (1966), or "second collision" cases, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (accidents caused by plaintiff's negligence but injuries
enhanced by defect), and to cases in which the defect and the plaintiffs misuse concur to
cause the harm, e.g., Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal. App.3d 510, 109
Cal. Rptr. 110 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1973), the court expressed its pleasure that given the
facts and the defendant's allegations "in this case we need not enter the quagmire." 88 N.M.
, 540 P.2d at 839.
at
While Judge Sutin conceded that the majority did not address the issue, he claimed that it
should have been considered because it was one of the defendant's theories of the case. 88
,540 P.2d at 843. See note 17 infra.
N.M. at
,540 P.2d at 844 (concurring opinion).
16. 88 N.M. at
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limit the circumstances under which the defense of misuse would be
permitted. 17
When the plaintiff's misconduct is the sole proximate cause of the
accident, Judge Sutin, in agreement with the majority, would permit
the defense of misuse' 8 to act as a bar to recovery. Thus, where a
defect exists but plays no part in causing the accident or enhancing
the injury because the plaintiff's misconduct alone has caused the
harm, the defense of misconduct is applicable as a bar to recovery.
When the accident or harm is caused by the concurrence of plaintiffs misconduct and a product defect Judge Sutin would severely
limit the availability of the misconduct defense. In such situations
plaintiff would normally be precluded from recovery because his
negligent conduct is a significant contributing factor in the events
leading to his injury, even though the harm was caused in part by the
defective product.' 9 But to permit the defense of misuse as a matter
of course in such cases might well frustrate the policy underlying
Section 402A "that the burden of accidental injuries caused by
products ... be placed on those who market them ... and that the

consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection
at the hands of ...those who market the products." 2 0 Particularly

17. Throughout his opinion, Judge Sutin assumes that the defendant claimed that misuse
was always available as a defense even if the misuse did not negate the defect as the cause of
the accident: "If we adopted defendant's contention, the jury could believe that [the
defect] was a proximate cause of the collision and yet deny plaintiff recovery because he
failed to keep a proper lookout." 88 N.M. at
,540 P.2d at 844.
In light of the majority's frequent characterization of the defendant's position in more
narrow terms, as where it stated, "We stress that, in the case at bar, defendant's theory of
the cases should be stated in terms of causation and not in terms of negligence or contributory negligence," 88 N.M. at
, 540 P.2d at 840, it is reasonably certain that Judge
Sutin's concurring opinion, whether correct or incorrect, addressed issues the majority
declined to discuss, and thus added to, but in no way contradicted the substantive positions
taken by the majority.
In view of the defendant-appellee's statement in the introduction of its brief that "in this
case, the cause of the accident is a basic contested issue. The defendant's theory of the case
is that the accident was caused by the driving conduct of the plaintiff," Brief for the
appellee at VI, it would seem that the majority correctly formulated the defendant's position.
18. 88 N.M. at
,540 P.2d at 846.
19. E.g., Johnson v. Primm, 74 N.M. 597, 396 P.2d 426 (1964); see Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § § 467, 465 (1965).
20. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A Comment c, at 349-50 (1965). The authors
of the most recent work on products liability conclude that there is a general trend in the
cases toward narrowing the availability of contributory negligence as a defense "so that, in
all situations where the defendant is at least partly responsible for the harm, he will bear the
cost as the party best able to do so." Noel and Phillips, Products Liability Cases and
Materials 608 (1976). Perhaps the most concise statement of the argument comes from
Professor Morris: "consumers can be taught to be more careful if the law penalizes them for
imprudence. Fostering careful manufacture is, however, more important than discouraging
incautious consumption. Pernicious products should be scrapped in the factory rather than
dodged in the home." Morris, Negligence in Tort Law, 53 Va. L. Rev. 899, 909 (1967).
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concerned that automobile drivers injured by the combination of a
defective product and their own failure to drive in a reasonable
manner might be unable to recover because their negligence would be
labeled misuse and treated as a defense under the majority's reasoning, 2'

Judge Sutin declared that in such cases of concurring causa-

tion, only when the misuse was not foreseeable by the defendantmanufacturer should it be a defense.' 2 While the issue of whether a
particular use is foreseeable is normally to be determined by a
jury,2 Judge Sutin would rule as a matter of law that negligent
driving is a foreseeable misuse of a motor vehicle and thus cannot be
interposed as a defense to a product liability action even when the
negligent driving combines with the product defect to cause the
accident. 4
Judge Sutin's conclusion that misuse of the product is a defense
only when it was not foreseeable to the defendant represents a position midway between extremes reached in other jurisdictions. The
New York Court of Appeals recently concluded that where plaintiff's
negligent misuse of an automobile combined with the existence of a
defect in the vehicle to cause the accident, plaintiff could not recover
The New York court did not
under a theory of strict liability.2
limit the availability of the defense to cases in which the misuse of
the product was not foreseeable to the defendant, but would permit
the defense of misuse to bar recovery whenever plaintiff's misconduct
was a concurring cause of the accident. 2 6 In contrast, the Supreme

21. But see note 15 supra.
, 540 P.2d at 845. Judge Sutin cites several cases which support this
22. 88 N.M. at
position. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1969) (Arizona
law). The distinction between foreseeable and unforeseeable misuse is also made in the
Restatement, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A Comment h, at 351-52 (1965),
though the Restatement would merely impose a duty upon the manufacturer to warn of the
dangers resulting from foreseeable misuse. The concurring opinion does not consider
whether an adequate warning against foreseeable forms of misuse will protect the manufacturer from liability, though at least where such a warning is read and understood by the
consumer, presumably there should be no liability because the consumer would be guilty of
"that form of contributory negligence [which] commonly passes under the name of
assumption of risk," Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A Comment n, at 356 (1965), a
,540 P.2d at 845.
defense which Judge Sutin would recognize. 88 N.M. at
23. 88 N.M. at
, 540 P.2d at 845. See, e.g., Olsen v. Royal Metals Corp., 392 F.2d
116 (5th Cir. 1968).
24. 88 N.M. at
, 540 P.2d at 843. Judge Sutin would thereby favor the plaintiff in
"second collision" and "crashworthiness" cases, an issue the majority declined to discuss.
Note 15 supra.
25. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973). New York has not
adopted the Restatement formulation of strict tort liability. However, other states which
have adopted § 402A have reached the same result. E.g., Enberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205
N.W.2d 104 (So. Dak. 1973). See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972).
26. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330,
, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29 (1973).
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Court of Alaska 2 7 has concluded that misuse of a product by the
plaintiff which concurs with the existence of a defect to cause harm
is never a defense to a strict tort liability action:
If a product is defective, if the plaintiff is unaware of that defect,
and if that defect is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury,
then the fact the plaintiff's negligent conduct may have concurred
with the defect to cause his injury should have no bearing ... [on
liability] .28

The Bendorf case offers only limited guidance to lawyers and
judges now attempting to formulate jury instructions in pending
cases. Yet, it is a necessary and valuable step in the process by which
New Mexico courts will determine the role that plaintiff's negligence
is to play in an action brought under Section 402A. The Court of
Appeals unanimously adopted the rules set forth in Comment n of
the Restatement, and there is no reason to doubt that when the
occasion presents itself, the Supreme Court will concur in that determination. On the more difficult issue of the significance-of plaintiff's
negligent misuse of the product, the Court of Appeals demonstrated
the inadequacy of the Restatement and Comment n as a source for a
controlling rule. The separate opinions of Judge Hendley and Judge
Sutin set forth tentative solutions for consideration. Whether New
Mexico ultimately adopts the approach taken in New York, that of
the Alaska Supreme Court or the compromise proposed by Judge
Sutin will of course only be resolved by the Supreme Court in a
decision which will certainly be enriched by this initial attempt of
the Court of Appeals to resolve the issue.

27. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970).
28. Id. at 329.

